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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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The authors estimate the impact of aggregate indicators 
of “soft” and “hard” infrastructure on the export 
performance of developing countries. They build four 
new indicators for 101 countries over the period 2004-
07. Estimates show that trade facilitation reforms do 
improve the export performance of developing countries. 
This is particularly true with investment in physical 
infrastructure and regulatory reform to improve the 
business environment. Moreover, the findings provide 
evidence that the marginal effect of infrastructure 
improvement on exports appears to be decreasing in per 
capita income. In contrast, the impact of information 
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department to explore the linkages between trade costs, facilitation, and economic development. This work is aligned with the 
project “Trade Facilitation and Economic Growth: The Development Dimension” in the Development Economics Research 
Group with support from the governments of Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom through the Multidonor Trust 
Fund for Trade and Development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org.  The authors may be contacted at aportugalperez@worldbank.org and jswilson@worldbank.org.
and communications technology on exports appears 
increasingly important for richer countries. Drawing on 
estimates, the authors compute illustrative exports growth 
for developing countries and ad-valorem equivalents of 
improving each indicator halfway to the level of the top 
performer in the region. As an example, improving the 
quality of physical infrastructure so that Egypt’s indicator 
increases half-way to the level of Tunisia would increase 
exports by 10.8 percent. This is equivalent to a 7.4 
percent cut in tariffs faced by Egyptian exporters across 
importing markets.Export Performance and Trade Facilitation Reform: 
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In an international trade environment of declining tariffs, trade facilitation—broadly 
defined as the set of policies aiming at reducing export and import costs—has been in the 
spotlight policy fora as the next key option to reduce trade costs in developing countries.  The 
relationship between export performance and trade facilitation is complex, not only because a 
country’s trade flows may change through its own trade facilitation reforms and through its 
trading partners’ reforms, but also because of the multi-dimensionality of trade facilitation.  
In a narrow sense, trade facilitation is associated with the reduction of on-the-border 
transaction costs other than tariff cuts, which essentially involves the simplification and 
standardization of customs formalities and administrative procedures related to international 
trade.  The current WTO negotiations on trade facilitation are mainly linked to this dimension of 
border (or customs) facilitation. In a broader sense, trade facilitation not only includes at-the-
border issues, but also beyond-the-border issues, dealing for instance with the business 
environment, the quality of infrastructure, transparency, and domestic regulations. All of these 
factors have an impact on export performance through the cost channel. Trade facilitation 
measures can be undertaken along two dimensions:  a “hard” dimension related to tangible 
infrastructure such as roads, ports, highways, telecommunications, as well as a “soft” dimension 
related to transparency, customs management, the business environment, and other institutional 
aspects that are intangible.  
A myriad of indicators related to different aspects of trade facilitation at the country level 
and with extensive geographic coverage have recently been collected by different organizations, 
and used in empirical research to estimate their impact on trade.
2 From an econometric point of 
view, including variables related to trade facilitation, measuring similar aspects on the right-hand 
side of a model, such as a gravity specification, can be conducive to multicolinearity.  A way of 
circumventing multicolinearity is to reduce the dimension of the data by aggregating highly 
correlated indicators into a single indicator. 
                                                            
2 See, for instance, Wilson et al. (2003, 2005), Francois and Manchin (2007), and Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2008). 3 
 
One of the contributions of this paper is the construction of four new aggregate indicators 
related to trade facilitation from a wide range of primary indicators using factor analysis, a 
statistical modeling technique that explains the correlation among a set of observed variables 
through an unobserved “common factor.”  To our knowledge, factor analysis has not yet been 
used to derive trade-related indicators. It not only helps to circumvent multicolinearity by 
reducing the dimensions of the data, it is a less arbitrary and more rigorous procedure for 
deriving an “aggregate” indicator compared with averaging out primary indicators.  Moreover, 
unlike principal component analysis, it assumes an underlying analytical model of causality 
assuming that unobserved variables (to be estimated by the procedure) –our indicators— cause 
observed variables –the primary indicators—and, thus, provides a more rigorous framework. The 
new aggregate indicators contain the information of a wider range of individual indicators than 
any previous study. 
Two of the four indicators are more related to the “hard” dimension of trade facilitation: 
i) physical infrastructure and ii) information and communications technology (ICT). The other 
two indicators are more closely linked to the “soft” dimension: iii) border and transport 
efficiency and iv) the business and regulatory environment. The indicators are derived for 101 
countries over the period 2004-07, a greater coverage than previous indicators and a more recent 
one. The indicators are derived from a pool of 20 primary indicators collected from different 
sources: Doing Business (DB), World Development Indicators (WDI), World Economic Forum 
(WEF), and Transparency International (TI).  Factor analysis is used in two stages: to select the 
primary indicators to be considered in each one of the four categories and to derive an indicator 
for each category.   
We assess the impact of different aspects related to trade facilitation, as measured by our 
indicators, on export performance by estimating a gravity model. Our study also departs from 
most previous papers as we estimate the gravity with a two-stage sample selection model 
(Heckman 1979) as in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (henceforth, HMR) (2008) to deal with 
sample selection bias due to country-pairs without trade (in at least one direction) and to examine 4 
 
the impact of trade facilitation on the extensive and intensive margins.
3 In order to implement the 
Heckman procedure on our sample, an identification variable influencing the probability of 
exporting but not the volume is required to comply with the exclusion restriction.  We enlarge 
the coverage of HMR’s entry cost indicator, which reflects the fixed entry costs for a pair of 
trading countries, and use it to satisfy the exclusion restriction in the Heckman estimation 
method.  The two-stage  approach allows assessment of export performance along the intensive 
margin (export volume growth) and extensive margin (propensity of trade between two 
countries). 
As a variation of our model, we incorporate interaction terms between our trade 
facilitation indicators and per capita GDP to analyze the differentiated impact of trade facilitation 
variables on exports by income cohorts. As there have been recent contributions to the 
econometric estimates of gravity models,
4 we check the robustness of our results to different 
estimation methods and restricting the sample to trade in different sectors.    
We also deal with the potential endogeneity of our trade-facilitation indicators to trade 
flows in three ways.  First, we employ a two-step procedure to isolate the part of each trade 
facilitation related indicator explained by income per capita and population, and use the 
unexplained residuals to proxy for the trade facilitation indicators. Second, the temporal variation 
of the trade facilitation indicators provides an additional way to deal with the endogeneity of 
trade facilitation indicators, as lagged variables can be used as instruments for contemporary 
values.  Third, we follow Freund and Rocha (2010) and restrict exports to new products to deal 
with reverse causality of exports to trade facilitation, as trade in  new goods cannot affect 
investment in ‘hard infrastructure’ or institutional reform.  To take into account omitted 
multilateral resistance effects, we follow the procedure originally proposed by Baier and 
Bergstrand (2009) for one-stage gravity estimates, and extended by Behar et al. (2009) to a two-
stage sample selection model, which consists of correcting bilateral variables. Our results suggest 
                                                            
3 The first stage consists of a probit model determining the probability that a country pair engages in trade, whereas 
the second stage is a gravity regression augmented by a term correcting for selectivity that is computed from the first 
stage, the inverse Mills ratio. 
4 See, for instance, Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2008), Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), Baier and 
Bergstran (2009), and Martin and Pham (2008). 5 
 
that trade facilitation reforms could improve the export performance of developing countries at 
the extensive and intensive margin, especially investment in physical infrastructure and 
regulatory reform to improve the business environment.  We also find evidence that the marginal 
effect of infrastructure improvement on exports seems to be decreasing in per capita income, 
whereas the impact of ICT on exports seems to be increasingly important for richer countries.  
Drawing on the gravity estimates, we provide an illustrative assessment of enhanced 
trade facilitation for each developing country by computing the growth in exports and ad-
valorem equivalent of improving each indicator halfway to the level of the top performer in the 
region.  For instance, improving the quality of physical infrastructure so that Egypt’s indicator 
increases half-way to the level of Tunisia would increase exports by 10.8 percent.  This is 
equivalent to a 7.4 percent cut in tariffs faced by Egyptian exporters across importing markets. 
Finally, we compare these illustrative exports growth and ad-valorem equivalents figures across 
countries.  
 From a policy standpoint, the findings of this paper are intended to contribute to a 
diagnostic assessment of the constraints on export facilitation along the “hard” and “soft 
dimensions, thereby contributing to the understanding of the potential gains in investment and 
reforms along different areas to improve export performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous empirical 
literature. Section 3 describes the primary measures used as inputs in our synthetic indicators, as 
well as the factor analysis to construct them. Section 4 addresses the augmented gravity model 
estimates and econometric strategy.  In Section 5, we provide illustrative counterfactual 
estimates in terms of export growth and the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of improving the 
indicators for developing countries halfway to the level of the top performer in their region.  
Section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Trade Facilitation: Definition and Overview of Previous Work  
This section briefly discusses the definition of trade facilitation and surveys selected 
work on the impact of trade facilitation on trade.  As trade facilitation has several dimensions, 6 
 
our survey only covers a selection of previous articles.  For more extensive surveys of the 
literature, see, for instance, Maur and Wilson (forthcoming). 
There is no exact and standard definition of trade facilitation.  It can be widely defined as 
any policy measure aimed at diminishing trade costs.  The meaning can vary depending on the 
issue at hand. In a narrow sense, trade facilitation measures are usually associated with the 
simplification and, in some cases, the harmonization of trade regulations, both procedural and 
administrative, that may work as impediments to trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
has traditionally used a narrow definition, simply saying that trade facilitation is “[t]he 
simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures.” Instead of focusing 
exclusively on factors on-the-border—such as the simplicity of export and import procedures—
other “behind the border” factors, such as transparency and enhancing the business environment, 
have been recognized to matter for facilitating trade. Due to the rapid integration of networked 
information technology in almost all aspects of the international supply chain, ICT, 
infrastructure, and services are frequently mentioned as important facilitators of trade.  
Trade facilitation measures can be thought of along two dimensions: investment in “hard” 
infrastructure (highways, railroads, ports, etc.) and in “soft” infrastructure (transparency, 
customs efficiency, institutional reforms, etc.). Of particular interest, this distinction makes it 
possible to compare the benefits and costs of investment or policy reform along both dimensions. 
Large investments in physical infrastructure projects to improve infrastructure quality alone do 
not necessarily lead to lower transport prices.  Complementary steps in regulatory reform are 
also fundamental. The lack of competition along the different segments in the trade logistics 
chain, for example, can result in high markups favoring cartels among logistics service firms. 
Corruption and interest groups capture can lead to regulatory barriers (such as market access 
restrictions, technical regulations, and customs regulations).
5 In a more competitive environment, 
measures to improve physical infrastructure are likely to produce better results. 
Empirical research assessing the impact of trade facilitation has to address three issues: 
defining and measuring trade facilitation indicators; choosing an econometric methodology to 
estimate the impact of trade facilitation on trade flows; and designing a scenario to estimate the 
                                                            
5 Regulation in transport services can protect inefficient logistics operators and discourage the entry of more modern 
logistics operators with lower operational costs. Reform to dismantle cartels and enhance competition along 
different segments of the logistics chain is crucial for lowering trade costs. 7 
 
effect of improved trade facilitation on trade flows. The methodology proposed by Wilson, 
Mann, and Otsuki (henceforth WMO) (2003) was the first to measure the impact of trade 
facilitation on trade performance using a gravity model. They focused on four dimensions of 
trade facilitation:  port infrastructure, customs environment, regulatory environment, and e-
business infrastructure. They constructed four indicators for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) countries for a single year by applying single averages to 13 primary variables, which 
were mostly collected from the WEF.  They estimated a gravity model that included the four 
indicators as well as other typical controls, such as the income level of individual countries, 
geography, and tariffs.  Using model estimates, WMO find that intra-APEC trade could increase 
by $254 billion, or 21 percent of intra-APEC trade flows, if APEC members with below-average 
indicators improved capacity halfway to the average for all members, about half the increase 
being derived from improved port efficiency.   
Subsequently, Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2005) expanded their four indicators to a larger 
set of countries. Using simulations based on their gravity model, they find that the total gain in 
trade flows in manufacturing goods from trade facilitation of the “below-average” countries 
“halfway” to global average levels yields an increase in global trade of $US377 billion. This can 
be decomposed as follows: $US157 billion and $US107 billion yielded by e-service 
infrastructure and port efficiency, respectively, as well as $US83 billion and $US33 billion due 
to improvements in the customs environment and the regulatory environment, respectively.   
To derive our indicators, we not only collect the WEF variables used by WMO
  and 
newly defined WEF variables
6, but also incorporate recent indicators from other sources 
available for at least the period 2003-07. In addition, the factor analysis methodology is used not 
only to construct the indicators but to define the sub-groups to be considered.   
Other regional studies have suggested the importance of infrastructure and institutional 
indicators for trade facilitation. Njinkeu, Wilson, and Fosso (2008) analyze the impact of reforms 
in port efficiency, the customs environment, the regulatory environment, and service 
infrastructure. They find that improvements in port efficiency and service infrastructures are the 
                                                            
6 Some of the original WEF primary variables found by WMO (2003, 2005) are no longer constructed or were 
modified. We are thankful to Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz for making World Economic Forum (WEF) data available 
for this research. 8 
 
primary factors driving intra-African trade expansion. Using a computable general equilibrium 
model, Abe and Wilson (2008) explore institutional trade facilitation indicators and find that 
reducing corruption and improving transparency in APEC countries to the average level of the 
region would increase trade in the region by 11 percent and global welfare would expand by 
$406 billion. Using detailed data on  transit, documentation, and ports and customs delays on 
Africa’s exports collected by Doing Business at the World Bank, Freund and Rocha (2010) find 
that that transit delays have the most economically and statically significant effect on African  
exports. They find that a one-day reduction in inland travel times leads to a 7 percent increase in 
exports.  
Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2008) construct aggregated indicators of trade facilitation (in 
the on-the-border sense), and infrastructure for 2003 and 2004, by applying simple average  to 
primary indicators mainly collected from Doing Business and the World Development 
Indicators. They estimate a standard gravity model augmented with these indicators and find a 
positive impact of the three indicators on exports.  As their paper focuses on Africa, they interact 
their indicators with an African dummy, and find that policies that improve their indicators yield 
a higher effect in African countries compared with the rest of the world.  
Francois and Manchin (2007) use principal components to construct two indicators on 
infrastructure and two indicators on institutional quality from various primary measures, mainly 
collected by the World Development Indicators and the Fraser Institute.  Although their 
indicators are robust determinants of export performance, they are not easily interpretable. 
Using indices of trade restrictiveness and trade facilitation developed at the World Bank, 
such as the Logistic Performance Index and Doing Business in a gravity model, Hoekman and 
Nicita (2008) suggest that tariffs and non-tariff measures continue to be a significant source of 
trade restrictiveness for low-income countries despite preferential access programs. This is 
because the value of trade preferences is quite limited: a new measure of the relative preference 
margin developed in the paper reveals that this is very low for most country-pairs. Most 
countries with very good (duty-free) access to a market generally have competitors that have the 
same degree of access.  
Regarding more-specific dimensions of trade facilitation, such as the time to trade, 
Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2006) find that, on average, each additional day a product is 9 
 
delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1 percent. Nordas, Pinali, and Geloso 
Grosso (2006) analyze the relation between time for import and export procedures, logistics 
services, and international trade, and find that time delays result in lower trade volumes and can 
reduce the probability that firms will enter export markets for time-sensitive products. Clark, 
Dollar, and Micco (2004) explain variations in trade costs due to port efficiency on bilateral trade 
flows. They show that improving port efficiency reduces shipping costs a lot. They find that 
improving port efficiency from the 25th to the 75th percentile can reduce shipping costs by 12 
percent.   
Eifert et al. (2005) explore firm-level data on total factor productivity for about 3,000 
firms in Africa over the period 2000–04. They show that a weak business environment is 
reflected in disproportionately high indirect costs, thereby lowering the return to labor in 
production and reducing demand for labor and real wages.   
 
3. Constructing Trade Facilitation Indicators Using Factor Analysis 
In the context of trade facilitation indicators, several approaches have been used to 
construct aggregate indicators from primary variables. The simplest approach is to average 
primary variables into an aggregate indicator; the underlying assumption is that the relative 
importance of each primary variable is proportional to its weight in the indicators.  Principal 
component analysis is another way of reducing the multidimensionality of the data, by 
transforming the data to a new coordinate system such that the greatest variance by any 
projection of the data comes to lie in the first coordinate or principal component, the second 
greatest variance on the second coordinate, and so on.  Francois and Manchin (2007) use 
principal component analysis to construct institutions and infrastructure indicators based on the 
first two components of each aspect. 
Unlike principal component analysis, factor analysis proposes an explicit underlying 
model that attempts to “explain” correlations among a set of m observed variables (X1, X2,…, 
Xm)  through the linear combination of a few latent (unobserved) random factors (Fs). In the case 
of a single factor, F, the underlying model is defined as:        10 
 













where  k   is the loading factor associated with the observed variable  k X . The procedure allows 
estimation of the factor loadings as well as estimates of the unobserved factor F per sub-group, 
the latter being retained as the synthetic indicator.  Loading factors provide information on the 
weights and correlation between each variable and the common factor; the higher the load, the 
more relevant is the primary variable in defining the dimensionality of a factor.
7   
 
Constructing the Indicators 
For this exercise, we retain a pool of 18 primary variables collected from different 
sources, such as WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report, Doing Business, the World 
Development Indicators,
8 and Transparency International. Two criteria were used to select the 
indicators that are part of the aggregated indicators: they should be available for at least the 
period 2004-07, and they should cover more than 100 countries.
9 Because the primary variables 
have different units and scales, we re-scale each indicator on a 0 to 1 continuous scale, such that 
a greater value indicates that the country is more advanced along the measured dimension.
10   
                                                            
7 For more details on factor analysis, see, for instance, Johnson and & Wichern (2001) and Reyment &. Joreskog 
(1996). 
 
8 Data from the World Development Indicators was included for GDP and population and for variables included in 
the regressions for robustness checks. 
9 Some indicators providing meaningful information related to trade facilitation with less geographical or temporal 
coverage were not included in the exercise, such as the logistics performance index (LPI).  Indeed, the LPI measures 
perceptions of the logistics environment in 140 countries but is only available for a single year. However, the 
aggregate indicators are significantly correlated with LPI for a single year, especially the physical infrastructure 
indicator. 
10 To preserve the year variability, we use the maximum value per indicator during the whole period and re-scale the 
indicators accordingly. 11 
 
We perform the factor analysis procedure in two stages:  as a preliminary stage, a 
diagnostic factor analysis procedure contributes to define the sub-group of variables to be 
considered for each indicator. Second, we re-run the procedure on the sub-groups to estimate the 
common factor to be taken as the indicator. 
In the first stage, the diagnostic factor analysis procedure is performed on two separate 
groups of primary variables; the first group consists of variables related to hard infrastructure, 
and the second one puts together variables related to soft infrastructure or institutional aspects. 
Again, the idea of this stage is to run a diagnosis as to identify sub-groups or primary variables 
within hard-infrastructure indicators and within soft-infrastructure indicators that would have 
higher correlations. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the loading factors of the diagnostic 
procedure as well as other statistics,  The loading factors estimated in the explanatory analysis 
show a clear regrouping of the primary variables of hard infrastructure into two sub-groups that 
we call physical infrastructure and information and communications technology (ICT) because 
of the variables considered in each of them.  Similarly, two sub-groups emerge clearly among the 
soft infrastructure variables, and we call them border and transport efficiency and business and 
regulatory environment.   
In the second stage, we re-run the factor analysis procedure on each of the four identified 
sub-groups in order to prevent the noise caused by adding variables that are unimportant.
11 In 
other words, we run four separate factor analysis procedures on each sub-group, with a single 
estimated factor retained by the data
12, which will be considered as our indicator. 
The four indicators derived from the four sub-groups of primary variables along the 
“soft” and “hard” dimensions of infrastructure are: 
HARD INFRASTRUCTURE:  
                                                            
11 Indeed, if we stop at the first-stage and derive two indicators from two factors in each group,  when the two 
indicators are constructed from the two factors in each group, the country rankings of such indicators change 
dramatically and implausiblyy. due to the noise added by variables unimportant to each sub-group. 
12 The data imposes one single factor in each procedure of the second stage, according to an iterative standard 
procedure (see for instance Rayment and Joreskog (1996)). 12 
 
1.  Physical infrastructure measures the level of development and quality of ports, airports, 
roads, and rail infrastructure.  
2.  Information and communications technology (ICT) is interpreted as the extent to which an 
economy uses information and communications technology to improve efficiency, and 
productivity as well as to reduce transaction costs. It contains indicators on the availability, 
use, absorption, and government prioritization of ICT. 
SOFT INFRASTRUCTURE: 
3.  Border and transport efficiency aims at quantifying the level of efficiency of customs and 
domestic transport that is reflected in the time, cost, and number of documents necessary for 
export and import procedures.   
4.  Business and regulatory environment measures the level of development of regulations and 
transparency. It is built on indicators of irregular payments, favoritism, government 
transparency, and measures to combat corruption. 
Table 1 here. Loading Factors, TF indicators 
Table 1 reports the final loading factors associated to each primary variable, as well as 
the percentage of variance explained by each identified factor.  In all cases, the first retained 
factor captures a large amount of the variation, which ranges from 77 percent in the case of 
border and transport efficiency, to 88 percent in the case of the business environment.
13   
Table 2 here. Summary Statistics for Values of Trade Facilitation Factors and Primary 
Indicators 
We provide some statistics of the derived indicators across regions and years. For 
simplicity, the synthetic indicators are also scaled on a range of 0 to 1. Table 2 reports summary 
statistics on the derived indicators and the underlying primary indicators, as well as the country 
with the highest and lowest scores throughout the panel. Figure 1 shows the average value of 
                                                            
13 Although in some cases, the factors associated to the different observed primary variables are similar --as in the 
group of the Business Environment indicator--,  the ranking of countries according to the indicators is different than 
the ranking of countries according to an indicator that is a simple average of primary variables. 13 
 
each indicator by region, benchmarked against the average value of OECD countries, at the right 
of each panel. Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have on average the lowest values, except 
along the Business Environment indicator, where South Asian (SAS) countries have a poorer 
average performance. Figure 2 illustrates the relative temporal variation of indicators per region.   
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) seem to have an improvement along the Border and Transport 
Efficiency indicator and Business Environment indicator by the end of the period that is 
relatively larger than other regions. There is a generalized upward evolution of the ICT indicator 
across regions.  Unsurprisingly, infrastructure is the indicator that evolves less (notice the 
different scale in the vertical axis for all graphs). 
 
4. TF Indicators and Trade Volumes: Econometric Model and Results 
This section provides an illustrative assessment of the relative importance of the different 
indicators of trade facilitation on trade using a gravity model of trade.   
Model Estimation Strategy 
Several studies have provided theoretical foundations for the gravity model and 
contributed to its popularity. These studies show that estimates can be derived from different 
theoretical frameworks, such as the Ricardian, Heckscher–Ohlin, and increasing returns to scale 
models. Theoretical foundations for estimating gravity equations were also enhanced in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004). More recently, Helpman et al. (2008) (henceforth 
HMR) develop an international trade model with firm heterogeneity. Their model incorporates 
firms with varying productivity so that only the more productive firms find it profitable to 
export, and the profitability of exports varies by destination, as exports are higher to countries 
with higher demand and lower variable and fixed export costs.
14 As in HMR, we apply a two-
                                                            
14 According to the model, the distribution of firms in country i exporting to country j is bound by a marginal firm 
that just breaks even when exporting to j, whereas more productive firms make positive profits when exporting to j. 
The model has several appealing characteristics that make it appropriate to explain some empirical patterns of trade 
flows. First, the model can generate asymmetric trade flows between two countries. Second, it can yield zero trade 
flows between some country pairs in either one or both directions. Third, the model yields a generalized gravity 
equation that accounts for the self-selection of firms into export markets and their impact on trade volumes. Finally, 
no information on the distribution of firms in a given country is required to carry out the estimation. 14 
 
stage sample selection model to take into account zero or missing bilateral trade flows.
15 The 
two-stage procedure aims at correcting the standard selection bias that can result from the 
necessity to drop observations with zero trade.   
More precisely, we estimate the following specification as the outcome equation in terms 
of our sample selection model: 
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where:  
-  Xijt   is country i exports to country j in year t. 
-  it it nsp_Effic Border_Tra  is the indicator for trading across the border of country i in year 
t. The higher the value, the more efficient the country is in trading across borders. 
-  it t Environmen   Business_   is the business environment indicator of country i in year t; the 
higher the value of the factor, the more business friendly the environment and regulations of the 
country. 
-  it ICT  represents the information and communications technology level that country i has 
and uses to improve efficiency and economic activity in year t. 
-  it ture Infrastruc  represents the quality level of infrastructure in country i in year t; the 
higher the value of the factor, the better the physical infrastructure of the country is.  
-  tijt, is the total average tariffs for imports of country j from country i in year t. 
-  it GDP  is gross domestic product of country i in year t. 
-  it Population  is population of country i in year t. 
                                                            
15 The first stage consists of a probit regression that explains the probability that country i exports to country j 
(selection equation), where the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to one if country i exports to country j. 
The second stage consists of a gravity equation estimated in logarithmic form that explains the volume of exports 
from i to j (outcome equation) and incorporates a term based on estimates of the first stage, the inverse Mills ratio, to 
correct for the non-random prevalence of zero trade flows. 
(1) 15 
 
-  ij ce Distan   is the distance between the capitals of countries i and j. 
-  ijt RTA  is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when countries i and j have an active 
preferential trade agreement in year t. 
-  i Landlocked  is 1 when country i is landlocked. 
-  ij Border  is 1 when countries i and j have a common border. 
-  ij guage Common_Lan  is 1 when countries i and j have the same language. 
-  ij p elationshi Colonial_R  is 1 when countries i and j have the same colonizers. 
-  ij onizer Common_Col  is 1 when countries i and j have the same colonizers post-1945. 
-  Ij and t   are two vectors with importer-specific and year-specific dummies. 
-  Ɛijt is a random error term satisfying the usual assumptions.   
 
Regarding the selection estimation, we assume that  ijt X  is observed when the following 
condition is met: 
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where:  ijt EntryCosts  is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the sum of the number of days and 
procedures to start a business is greater than the median for country i and country j, or if the sum 
of the relative costs of starting a business (as percentage of GDP per capita,) are greater than the 
median for both countries, and 0 otherwise. Using Doing Business data on the regulations to start 
a business, we updated the indicator for fixed entry costs constructed by HMR (2008) to cover 
more countries and more years. By construction, this variable reflects regulation costs that 
should not depend on a firm’s volume of exports to a given country, and satisfies the exclusion 
restrictions of the two-stage Heckman estimation method, as it is excluded from the outcome 
equation. 
  Equation (1) sets the determinants of the volume of trade, provided that one of the 
partners has positive exports to the other, while Equation (2) defines the selection criteria.  
(2) 16 
 
Francois and Manchin (2007) and Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2008) use a similar estimation 
strategy to estimate the impact of infrastructure and institutions on trade.
16 We include fixed 
effects for both, importers and years. A complete specification would also require fixed effects 
for exporters to control for multilateral resistance terms (MRTs),
17 but their inclusion can wipe 
out the effect of exporter-specific variables that do not vary substantially throughout the four-
year panel, such as the trade facilitation indicators for exporters.
18    
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) introduce a method for “approximating” price index 
multilateral resistance terms using a first-order Taylor expansion, yielding a log-linear 
expression for multilateral resistance terms (MRTs) that is a function of exogenous variables. It 
can be included in the estimation equation to be estimated with a simple OLS method. The 
approach has the advantage of producing tractable comparative statistics that underline the role 
of country size in MRTs, as trade barriers have a large impact on the terms of small countries, 
which typically trade a large proportion of their output internationally. While estimating the 
impact of a country’s trade logistics system on its exports, Behar, Manners, and Nelson (2009) 
proxy MRTs using Baier and Bergstrand’s method in a two-stage selection model of gravity akin 
to Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008).  
In this research, we follow a procedure similar to Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and Behar, 
Manners, and Nelson (2009) in our estimates to correct bilateral trade cost variables to consider 
                                                            
16 Francois and Manchin (2007) do not satisfy the exclusion restriction in their Heckman estimates. Iwanow and 
Kirkpatrick (2008) use an alternative variable of common religion as suggested by Helpman et al. (2008).  However, 
a religion variable does not have the temporal variation necessary for our sample.  
17 Anderson and van Wincoop (henceforth AvW) (2003) solve the so-called border puzzle–the implausibly large 
negative effect of the U.S.-Canada border on trade between Canadian provinces and U.S. states highlighted by 
McCallum (1995) — by showing that general equilibrium effects of changes in trade costs work through the price 
indices that enter the bilateral gravity equations.  Indeed, traditional estimates do not control properly for 
theoretically motivated price index terms, which aggregate both domestic and international trade costs, and therefore 
capture the effect of trade with third countries on bilateral trade, or “multilateral resistance.”  AvW show that 
bilateral trade flows depend on bilateral trade costs relative to multilateral resistance.  
 
18 Indeed, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) recognize that one of the drawbacks of using fixed effects dummies is the 
preclusion of direct estimation of partial effects from numerous potentially-important explanatory variables often 
motivated theoretically (e.g. the effects of exporter and importer populations, foreign aid, or internal infrastructure 
measures on bilateral trade). As the authors argue, these variables can be subsumed in the fixed effects.   17 
 
MRT. In a nutshell, implementing the procedure consists of replacing bilateral variables that 
account for theoretical bilateral trade costs in the specification and vary across exporter-importer 
pairs, namely: tij,  ij ce Distan  ,
  ij RTA ij Border , ij guage Common_Lan ,  ij p elationshi Colonial_R , and 
ij onizer  Common_Col  , for its MRT-corrected expressions.  
In the case of a continuous variable, such as distance, the corresponding MRT-corrected 
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The MRT-corrected terms take into account the temporal variation of multilateral 
resistance terms as GDP shares evolve over time.  As shown below, our estimates of the impact 
of trade facilitation variables on exports do not vary substantially when correcting for MRT. 
 
Data  
The dataset covers 101 countries over the period 2004-07. Aggregate trade flows were 
compiled from the Commodity and Trade Database (COMTRADE), whereas tariffs were 
compiled from TRAINS. We use the average of applied tariff rates, from 2004 to 2007. To avoid 
a significant loss of observations, tariff data for some countries were linearly extrapolated for 
pairs of countries that had at least two of the four years under study. 
Core gravity variables, such as bilateral distances, colonial ties, and common language 
dummies were obtained from the CEPII website. Other relevant variables, such as GDP and 
population, were available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).  
 18 
 
Estimation and Results 
Table 3 reports estimates for the two-stage Heckman selection model defined by 
expressions (1) and (2).  Columns 1a and 1b report the estimated coefficients of the outcome and 
the selection equations, respectively. In the outcome equation, the coefficients of all four trade 
facilitation indicators are positive and significant.  As trade facilitation indicators are scaled on a 
zero-one interval, the magnitude of estimated coefficients can be informative of the relative 
impact of these aspects on trade. The coefficient of physical infrastructure is, indeed, the largest 
of all four. Business environment seems to be the next important factor for exporters, followed 
by ICT and border and transport efficiency. All other coefficients are significant and have the 
expected signs. Indeed, higher tariffs, longer distance between partners discourage trade, as well 
as being landlocked. By contrast, the trade volume is higher between partners in a regional trade 
agreement, as well as between richer and more populous countries. Contiguous partners, 
countries having a common official language, and countries having had a common colonizer or a 
colonial relationship are also likely to trade more intensively. The selection equation estimates 
(column 1b) provide a hint on the impact of each determinant on the probability of exporting, the 
so-called extensive margin. Most coefficients are significant and have the same sign as in the 
outcome equations. Only the coefficient of business environment has a negative sign, although it 
is non-significant. The coefficient of the entry-cost variable appearing in the first stage is 
negative and significant, as countries with higher entry barriers are less likely to trade.
19   
Table 3 here:  Baseline Estimates  
As explained above, including exporter-specific dummies wipes out the effect of trade 
facilitation variable, as the latter do not vary considerably on time and can be subsumed in the 
fixed effects, as reported in table A3 of the Appendix. As an additional check to compare the 
explanatory power of our trade facilitation variables with respect to other regressors in the 
model, we perform a two-step procedure. In the first step, we estimate our baseline model 
replacing our exporter specific variables with exporter dummies. In the second step, we regress a 
                                                            
19 A similar exercise was carried out excluding the tariff variable leading to similar estimates, as reported in table A3 
of the Appendix. We also estimated a symmetric equation where the impact of importer-specific variables, including 
trade facilitation ones, on a country’s imports.  Estimates are similar and are also reported in table A3. 19 
 
variable ‘y’ containing the estimates of exporter-dummy coefficients, which can be interpreted as 
the volume of trade predicted by exporter dummies, on exporter’s trade facilitation indicators 
and other variables of the model.  For each regressor in the second step, we estimate the squared 
partial correlation (a measure of total variance of ‘y’ explained by the regressor and not 
associated to other variables) and the squared semipartial correlation (the reduction in the R-
squared when the regressor is removed from the regression). The estimates are further explained 
and reported in Appendix B. Overall, the trade facilitation indicators, notably physical 
infrastructure, have a greater contribution to the total variance of ‘y’ in comparison to other 
variables, such as tariffs, distance, or colonial dummies. 
Columns 2a and 2b report estimates of a specification that replaces the entry-cost variable 
in the selection equation with a dummy that equals 1 if country i’s exports to country j were 
positive in the previous year (t-1). The rationale is that countries having positive export flows in 
the preceding year are more likely to export during the current year. The estimates do not change 
substantially. 
We replace variables that vary across exporter-importer pairs with MRT-corrected 
expressions in order to better account for multilateral resistance.  The estimates reported in 
Column 3a and 3b do not vary greatly.  Whereas the coefficients of infrastructure, business 
environment and border and transport efficiency are larger than baseline estimates, ICT 
coefficient becomes implausibly negative.  Yet, infrastructure and business environment remain 
the indicators with the greatest impact on exports.  Compared with the MRT-corrected 
specification, the baseline specification (1a and 1b) leads to slightly smaller effects of trade 
facilitation indicators on exports. Thus, we use estimates the baseline specification for 
simulations, as they lead to more conservative estimates.  
Finally, we report in columns 4a and 4b estimates of a regression that includes an 
interaction term for each trade facilitation indicator with respect to per-capita income.  We plot 
in Figure 3 the associated marginal effects of our indicators for different levels of per-capita 
income.  The marginal effect of the quality of infrastructure on exports seems to be decreasing in 
income, as its significant and negative interaction coefficient shows.  By contrast, the impact of 
ICT on exports seems to be increasingly important for richer countries.  An interpretation along 20 
 
these lines is less clear for the other two institutional variables, as the coefficients of the 
interaction terms are not significant. 
Figure 3 Marginal impacts of the indicators as function of per capita GDP 
We check the consistency of the baseline estimates along different (one-stage) estimation 
techniques and report the results in Table 4. For comparison purposes, column 1 reproduces the 
baseline estimates of the outcome equation defined by equation (1). Column 2 reports estimates 
of the standard traditional model using OLS, which is basically the outcome equation in column 
1 without the inverse Mills ratio. Column 3 shows estimates of a Tobit model that takes account 
more properly of the censorship of the dependent variable, where the dependent variable is 
exports plus a dollar in logarithmic terms. However, as shown by de Melo and Portugal-Perez 
(2008), coefficient estimates can be very sensitive to this (arbitrary) choice of adding one dollar.  
Eaton and Tamura (ET) (1994) proposed to estimate a variation of the Tobit model in which the 
independent variable is ln(Xij +a) and the maximum likelihood (ML) function is modified to 
endogenize the choice of the parameter “a.” Estimates based on the ET-Tobit variation are 
reported in column 5.  Finally, column 6 reports estimates along the Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) model, proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (SS-T) (2006) to deal with 
heteroskedasticity in constant-elasticity models.
20  In the majority of cases, the estimates of our 
indicators remain positive and significant. Infrastructure has the largest estimated coefficient, 
except in the PPML column, where it is non-significant. 
Table 4 here:  Estimation with different methods. 
Robustness Checks 
                                                            
20 Using Monte-Carlo simulations, they show that that the PPML produces estimates with the lowest bias 
for different patterns of heteroskedasticity. However, Martin and Pham (2008) notice that the data-generating 
process used by SS-T does not produce zero-values properly.  When correcting the data-generating process to obtain 
a sample with an important amount of zero-value observations – a situation closer to ours – Martin and Pham find 




There is a potential reverse causality problem, as hard and soft infrastructure could also 
be driven by trade and integration, as well as the other way around. Indeed, countries exporting 
more may have higher returns to invest in enhancing hard or soft infrastructure. Although the 
causality is likely to go ways, better hard infrastructure as well as better institutional components 
are more likely to have a direct and immediate effect on the likelihood and the volume of exports 
rather than the other way around.  As seen on Figure 1, the distribution of the indicators obtained 
in this paper does not change greatly from year to year, especially for physical infrastructure, 
meaning that there was not any unexpected change in trade facilitation due to an export surge or 
fall.  Moreover, using factor analysis to construct the synthetic indicators attenuates the 
endogeneity problem. Nevertheless, we address the potential problem of endogeneity in three 
additional ways.   
First, we employ a two-step procedure to isolate the part of each trade facilitation related 
indicator explained by income per capita and population, and use the unexplained residuals to 
proxy for the trade facilitation indicators.  The first step consists of regressing each synthetic 
indicator against GDP per capita and population using simple OLS. We use lagged values to 
address the potential bias arising from reverse causality: 
it k t i t i e Population pc GDP , 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 it k, ) ln( ) _ ln( ) ln(TF_k           
where TF_ k denotes each of the four trade facilitation indicators (infrastructure, ICT, business 
environment, and border and transport efficiency). The residuals,  it k e , , measure the deviations 
from income and population conditional expected values of each indicator and replace the trade 
facilitation indicators in the baseline specification.  The procedure has a limit as it only takes into 
account the omitted variable bias due to GDP and population. Column 1a in Table 5 reports 
sample-selection estimates using this procedure.
21The coefficients for the residuals of 
infrastructure and business environment are positive and significant in the outcome equation. 
The ICT and business environment proxies have non-significant coefficients. Although a similar 
approach is adopted by Francois and Manchin (2007) as well as by Iwanow and Kirkpatrick 
(2008), the residuals or proxies obtained with this procedure are not useful for ranking the 
                                                            
21 Table 5 only reports estimates for the outcome equation for briefness. 22 
 
performance of a country along the trade facilitation dimension. Indeed, the ranking of countries 
according to the estimated residuals diverges substantially from the ranking of countries along 
the original indicators, making policy inferences difficult.  Therefore, these estimates are just 
illustrative and are reported for completeness. 
Table 5 here:  Robustness checks 
Second, column 2 reports estimates when TF indicators are instrumented by their 3-year 
lagged value to reduce the bias that may arise from potential reverse causality.  As the panel has 
observations for four years, the sample is reduced to a cross section when using the 3-year lag 
indicators. The coefficients for physical infrastructure, business environment, and ICT are 
similar to the baseline estimates, whereas the coefficient for border and transport efficiency is 
greater, which may be due to the fact that the latter variable evolves more over time than the 
other three indicators.  
Third, we follow Freund and Rocha (2010) and examine the effect of trade facilitation on 
trade in new products
22. The intuition is that trade in goods having not been exported in the past 
cannot have had an impact on the historical development of either hard infrastructure or in 
institutions.  Column 3 reports estimates of the model when exports are restricted to new goods.  
The coefficients of the four indicators are positive and significant, with similar magnitude.  The 
effect of physical infrastructure is smaller than the baseline estimates.  On one hand, it can be 
interpreted as evidence that endogeneity tended to overstate the effect of physical infrastructure 
on exports.  On the other hand, it can only be interpreted as proof that physical infrastructure has 
a greater impact on exports of new products (extensive margin), than in existing products 
(intensive margin), the latter just being a small share of total exports. It is also consistent with the 
previous finding that physical infrastructure has a smaller effect for richer countries, who tended 
to export more new products during this period
23.  
                                                            
22 We define new products as goods that were not exported in the period 1999-2002 and that entered into the export 
market in the interval 2003-2006. 
23 More estimates on the sample of newly exported goods can be found in table A4 in the Appendix. 23 
 
The total number of kilometers of roads, often divided by either the area of the country or 
the population, and the percentage of paved roads in a country are frequently taken as measures 
of hard infrastructure. (See, for instance, Francois and Manchin (2007) and Iwanow and 
Kirkpatrick (2008).) Yet, these indicators may not be fully comparable across countries, as they 
do not take into account other country-specific dimensions, such as population density, the 
location of cities, or the concentration of economic activity. For completeness, we apply factor 
analysis to construct a modified indicator of physical infrastructure, which in addition to the 
original primary indicators includes the percentage of paved roads and the total kilometers of 
roads divided by the population and the area of a country. Column 4 presents estimates of the 
baseline specification that incorporates the modified infrastructure index, which has a coefficient 
almost twice as large as the coefficient of the original infrastructure index in the baseline 
estimates (Table 3). 
Column 5 shows estimates of the two-stage procedure using average values for time-
varying variables over the period 2004-07.  The coefficients remain similar to the baseline 
estimates. Finally, in order to include exporter-specific dummies in addition to importer-specific 
dummies, we replace exporter-specific trade facilitation variables with the log of the sum of 
importer and exporter variables of trade facilitation, and report estimates in Column 6. The 
underlying assumption −not necessary verified− is that equal importance is given to levels of 
trade facilitation in the exporter and in the importer. Coefficients for infrastructure and business 
environment are significant, whereas coefficient for ICT is negative and significant. Indeed, as 
some of the variables do not change significantly for some countries and their impact on exports 
may be captured by exporter-specific dummies. 
  As a final robustness check, we estimate the baseline model on different samples.  
Columns 1 to 4 report estimates where the sample is restricted respectively to different sectors: 
fuels, ores and metals, manufactures and textiles; whereas columns 5 and 6 examine exports 
from Southern countries to Northern countries and other Southern countries, respectively.  The 
impact of physical infrastructure is greater than the baseline estimate for fuels and ores and 
metals.  Whereas ICT has a negative and significant sign for ores and metals, as well as in the 
last two regressions that focus on Southern exports.  This can reinforce the former findings that 24 
 
countries with lower income tend to export those commodities and ICT tends to have a lower 
marginal impact the lower the income of a country.  
Table 6 here:  Estimates on different samples. 
5. Potential Benefits from Trade Facilitation: Counterfactual Estimates 
Based on our baseline estimates, we simulate the effects of improving each aspect of 
trade facilitation on the export performance of the developing countries in the sample.
24 As the 
model contains tariffs, the coefficient estimates are used to compute counterfactual ad-valorem 
variations that would otherwise be generated by a benchmark variation of our composite 
indicators. The benchmark retained in this exercise is an improvement of each exporter’s 
indicators halfway to the level of the top performing country in the region along each indicator. 
To illustrate how these counterfactuals are estimated, suppose that regulatory reform or 
investment in the ICT sector of an exporter country leads to a 1 percent increase in the ICT 
indicator. This leads to a change in trade flows of about   ICT  ˆ  percent according to the gravity 
estimates.
25 The same change in trade flows would be brought about if all importers were to cut 
the tariffs applied to imports from the country by an equivalent value Tariffs ICT   ˆ / ˆ . Therefore, the 
latter ratio roughly represents the “ad-valorem tariff-cut equivalent” or “ad-valorem equivalent” 
of a 1 percent change in the cost of export procedures inferred from gravity model estimates.    
We simulate the effects of improving each aspect of trade facilitation on trade. We took 
into consideration the disparities among countries by performing regional simulations using the 
best performing country in each index as the benchmark. Counterfactual estimates are reported in 
Figure 4. As expected,  countries with lower values of trade facilitation indicators would 
experience higher export growth after the improvement along their trade facilitation indicators. 
                                                            
24 For simplicity, we use coefficient estimates of the outcome equation (second-stage) and disregard the marginal 
effects of the indicators on the selection equation (first stage) that feed in the second stage through marginal changes 
in the inverse Mills ratio.  
25 For notation purposes, let  X  ˆ  be the estimated elasticity of imports with respect to the variable X entering in the 
gravity equation. In the case of Doing Business export costs, the estimates should be negative. 25 
 
To illustrate the analysis, we briefly discuss the simulation results for selected countries with the 
lowest performance in each region. 
 
Figure 4. Simulation Results: Exports growth an ad-valorem equivalent of an increase in 
each indicator half-the-way to level of the exporter 
 
Simulation Results 
  In all regions, with the exception of South Asia, investment in physical infrastructure 
quality halfway to the top performer will result in the greatest trade gains. In addition, it is worth 
mentioning the importance of regional characteristics for policy decision making. For instance, 
improvements in infrastructure in Sub-Saharan African countries would generate an important 
increase in trade flows, whereas for some South Asian countries, investment in improving the 
business environment would generate the greatest return. In most regions, improved border and 
transport efficiency to the benchmark is associated with lower exports growth as the estimated 
elasticity of this indicator on exports is the lowest among four indicators. Furthermore, countries 
of these regions are not so heterogeneous along this indicator. 
 East Asia and Pacific 
If investment in Mongolia were to improve the quality of infrastructure halfway to the 
level of Malaysia, the country with the best infrastructure in East Asia, then exports of the former 
would increase by 58.9 percent. In other words, the increase in trade in Mongolia due to this 
improvement of infrastructure would be equivalent to a 40.3 percent reduction in the value of 
current tariffs on goods from Mongolia. If investment were focused on the improvement of 
information and communications technology or border and transport efficiency halfway to the 
level of the best performer, Mongolia’s exports would increase by only 7.4 and 3.0 percent, 
respectively.  
The improvement of business environment in Mongolia appears to be the second best 
alternative after infrastructure. Investment to improve the business environment half the way to 
the level of Malaysia would increase exports by 12.7 percent; in other words, this improvement 
in exports would be equivalent to a reduction of 8.7 percent in current import tariffs. 26 
 
Europe and Central Asia 
Levels of development in trade facilitation vary widely across countries in this region. In 
the case of infrastructure, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country with the lowest level of 
infrastructure quality, would experience an important increase in exports (53 percent) by 
improving its infrastructure to half the level of Lithuania.  This increase in exports would also be 
feasible if Bosnia and Herzegovina reduced its current import tariffs by 36.3 percent.   
In this region, improvements in border and transport efficiency also have a high rate of 
return. For instance, if investment in Kazakhstan were to improve its border and transport 
efficiency halfway to the level of Romania, Kazakhstan would increase its exports by 23.2 
percent. This increase in exports is equivalent to a reduction of 15.8 percent in import tariffs.    
Middle East and North Africa 
The picture for countries in the Middle East and North Africa reveals significant gains in 
trade due to an increase in investment in infrastructure and ICT. Considering the lowest ranked 
country, Algeria, an increase in the level of infrastructure to half the level of Tunisia would yield 
an increase of 18.8 percent in the volume of exports. For instance, if investment in Algeria were 
to improve the quality of ICT halfway to level of Tunisia, exports would increase by 6.6 percent; 
this would be equivalent to a reduction of 4.5 percent in import tariffs.    
Latin America and the Caribbean 
  In Latin America, Bolivia appears to be the country that would benefit the most from an 
improvement in infrastructure quality. If Bolivia were to improve to half the level of Chile, 
exports would increase by 49.1 percent. The same increase in exports would also be possible if 
Bolivia reduced its import tariffs by 33.6 percent.  
  The results also show that improvement in the business environment, the second best 
alternative in the region, is very important for Venezuela. This country would increase exports 
by 26.5 percent if investment were to improve in this area to half the level of Chile, the best 
performer of the region. A reduction of 18.1 percent in the current ad-valorem tariffs would be 
necessary to obtain the same level of improvement in exports.  27 
 
South Asia 
  Different from the other regions, South Asia appears to receive better returns to 
investment in the business environment. The results show that Bangladesh, the country with the 
lowest value for the business environment index, would experience the highest export growth 
after improvement in this indicator halfway to that of India. The increase in trade (38.4 percent) 
due to improvement in the business environment would be equivalent to a 26.3 percent reduction 
in the value of current tariffs on goods from Bangladesh.  
  If Bangladesh were to improve its level of infrastructure quality to half the level of India, 
exports would increase by 17.6 percent. This increase in exports would be equivalent to a 
reduction of 12.1 percent in the value of import tariffs.   
Sub-Saharan Africa 
  Countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region also experience a dramatic increase in 
exports. For instance, if investment were focused to improve the infrastructure quality of Chad 
halfway to the level of South Africa, trade levels of the former would increase by 79.3 percent. 
This increase in exports would also be feasible with a reduction of 57.7 percent in import tariffs. 
  If Chad were to invest in improving the business environment, exports would increase by 
22.6 percent. If Cameroon were to invest in the business environment to improve the indicator to 
half the level of South Africa, exports would increase by 16.8 percent. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Overall, the results show that improvement in infrastructure quality would bring the 
greatest benefits in terms of export growth. The analysis of the effects of these factors on trade 
flows provides useful information to guide policymakers on which might be the area or areas in 
which resource allocation would bring the greatest benefits.  Among our four indicators, physical 
infrastructure has the greatest impact on exports in almost all specifications, and samples.  
Furthermore, we found evidence that the impact of physical infrastructure is decreasing with the 28 
 
income level, whereas the opposite occurs with ICT, for which the richer the country, the greater 
its marginal impact on export performance. 
Illustrative estimates show that improvements in infrastructure and border and transport 
efficiency halfway to the level of the regional top performer can be substantial. However, the 
high cost of investment in physical infrastructure is a factor to be considered. Of course, 
investment in physical infrastructure can also have large spillovers that should be taken into 
account in the cost-benefit analysis, but they are difficult to measure. 
The net balance of costs and benefits cannot yet be stated with certainty for a given 
country.  Such an assessment can only be made within the framework of specific infrastructure 
project appraisals, and it can only be addressed on a case-by-case basis. However, improvement 
in other areas, such as border and transport efficiency, where costs are considerably lower in 
comparison with investment in physical infrastructure, shows promising results for developing 
countries.  Although general estimates on the yield of these projects is difficult to obtain, Helble, 
Mann, and Wilson (2009) use detailed data on aid flows to estimate the responsiveness of trade 
flows to specific types of foreign aid directed to enhancing trade competitiveness in developing 
countries.  They find that relatively small amounts of aid targeted at policy and regulatory 
reform, in contrast to aid for broad sector-specific projects or trade-related infrastructure has 
relatively greater elasticity with respect to trade flows.  Indeed, they estimate that a one percent 
increase in aid directed toward trade policy and regulatory reform yields an increase of 0.009 
percent in trade.  This implies that average marginal effect in the authors’ sample of that a one 
dollar increase in aid would result in an increase of about US$697 in trade.  
Hallaert and Munro (2009) propose to adapt the growth diagnostics procedure developed 
by Haussman et al. (2005) to trade expansion, in order to pinpoint the most binding constraints 
affecting trade performance in a given country.  An approach along these lines based on a more 
rigorous microeconomic setting can be a promising road to identify constraints to trade 
expansion in a given country. 
In summary, this paper intends to provide policymakers information about the 
effectiveness of possible interventions in four areas of trade facilitation. We stress that the results 
presented here are targeted at stimulating discussion and helping policymakers and stakeholders 
arrive at a tentative prioritization of their efforts in this area.  In the future, more detailed analysis 
is required in relation to particular reform programs, covering costs and benefits for a developing 29 
 
country. In addition, our results have only addressed the static impacts of trade facilitation 
reform, without assessing directly their impact on growth, productivity, and overall development 
as such.  Yet, empirical evidence suggests that there are good reasons to believe that better trade 
facilitation can impact each of these positively.   30 
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Revisiting Trade Facilitation Indicators and Export Performance. 
Alberto Portugal-Perez and John S. Wilson  
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Loading Factors, Trade Facilitation Indicators 
1a. Information and communications technology 
Cumulative variance 
Factor Variance  Proportion 
ICT 3.41 0.85 
Rotated factor loadings 
       Variable  Factor1  Uniqueness 
      Availability of latest ICT technology  0.96  0.08 
      Level of technology absorption  0.93  0.13 
      Extent of business internet use  0.93  0.14 
      Government prioritization of ICT  0.87  0.24  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
1b. Physical infrastructure 
Cumulative variance 
Factor Variance  Proportion 
Infrastructure 3.30  0.83 
 
Rotated factor loadings 
Variable Factor1  Uniqueness 
      Quality of ports infrastructure  0.94 0.11 
      Quality of airports infrastructure  0.92 0.16 
      Quality of roads infrastructure  0.94 0.11 
      Quality of railroad infrastructure   0.82 0.32 
      Source: Authors’ calculations. 33 
 
1c. Business environment 
Cumulative variance 
Factor Variance  Proportion 
Business environment  5.30  0.88 
 
Rotated factor loadings 
Variable Factor1  Uniqueness 
      Government transparency   0.96 0.09 
      Public trust for government  0.92 0.16 
      Irreg. payments in exports and imports  0.92 0.15 
      Irreg. payments in public contracts  0.96 0.08 
      Measures to combat corruption  0.95 0.09 
      Favoritism of gov. to well-connected  
      firms  0.93 0.14 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
1d. Border and transport efficiency 
Cumulative variance 
Factor Variance  Proportion 
Eff. trading across borders  3.09  0.77 
 
Rotated factor loadings 
Variable Factor1  Uniqueness   
      Number of documents to export  0.83 0.32 
      Number of days to export  0.92 0.15 
      Number of documents to import  0.86 0.26 
      Number of days to import  0.91 0.17 
       Source: Authors’ calculations. 34 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Values of Trade Facilitation Factors and Primary 
Indicators 
Indices/variables Mean  SD  Lowest  performance  Highest  performance  Source 
              
Information and Communications Tech. 
Indicator 0.49  0.24  Zimbabwe  0.01  Sweden  1 
 
      Availability of latest ICT technology 0.62  0.19  Moldova  0.27  Sweden  1  WEF 
      Level of technology absorption  0.73 0.13 Bolivia  0.41  Iceland  1 WEF 
      Extent of business internet use  0.62  0.17  Algeria  0.32  Rep. of Korea  1  WEF 
      Government prioritization of ICT 0.68  0.14  Zimbabwe  0.33  Singapore  1  WEF 
              
Infrastructure Indicator  0.49  0.24 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 0.05  Singapore  1   
      Quality of ports infrastructure  0.56  0.21  Armenia  0.17  Singapore  1  WEF 
      Quality of airports infrastructure 0.67  0.16  Paraguay  0.27  Singapore  1  WEF 
      Quality of roads infrastructure  0.57  0.21  Mongolia  0.23  France  1  WEF 
      Quality of railroad infrastructure   0.46  0.23  Paraguay  0.15  Switzerland  1  WEF 
              
Border and Transport Efficiency Indicator  0.69  0.19  Kazakhstan  0.02  France  1   
      Number of documents to export  0.50  0.16  Kyrgyzstan   0.15  France  1  DB 
      Number of days to export  0.25 0.16 Kazakhstan  0.06  Estonia  1 DB 
      Number of documents to import  0.49  0.17  Azerbaijan  0.14  France  1  DB 
      Number of days to import  0.25 0.16 Kazakhstan  0.03  Singapore  1 DB 
              
Business Environment Indicator  0.44  0.25  Bangladesh  0.01  Denmark  1   
      Government transparency   0.48  0.24  Bangladesh  0.15  Finland  1  TI 
      Public trust for government  0.44  0.19  Zimbabwe  0.18  Singapore  1  WEF` 
      Irreg. payments in exports and imports 0.70  0.17  Bangladesh  0.34  Denmark  1  WEF 
      Irreg. payments in public contracts 0.63  0.17  Bangladesh  0.26  Iceland  1  WEF 
      Measures to combat corruption  0.67  0.16  Cameroon  0.35  Finland  1  WEF 
      Favoritism of gov. to well-connected firms 0.59  0.17  Venezuela  0.28  Finland  1  WEF 
                      
       Note: Each variable and factor was standardized to values that range from 0 to 1 to facilitate comparison.      





Table 3.  Baseline Estimates 
  1(a)  1(b)  2(a)  2(b)  3(a)  3(b)  4(a)  4(b) 




   Outcome  Selection  Outcome  Selection  Outcome  Selection  Outcome  Selection 
Ln(Border_Transport_Effic_i)  0.071  0.265  -0.03  0.147  0.111  0.226  0.463  -0.87 
  [0.041]*  [0.025]***  [0.041]  [0.025]***  [0.042]***  [0.024]***  [0.314]  [0.257]*** 
Ln(Business_ Environment_i)  0.147  -0.047  0.183  -0.02  0.259  0.004  0.344  -0.199 
  [0.030]***  [0.030]  [0.031]***  [0.029]  [0.032]***  [0.027]  [0.155]**  [0.222] 
Ln(ICT_i)  0.118  0.066  0.005  0.056  -0.218  0.04  -1.552  -0.106 
  [0.036]***  [0.028]**  [0.036]  [0.029]*  [0.038]***  [0.026]  [0.200]***  [0.211] 
Ln(Infrastructure_i)  0.467  0.196  0.417  0.087  0.651  0.173  1.313  0.795 
   [0.045]***  [0.040]***  [0.046]***  [0.039]**  [0.047]***  [0.037]***  [0.252]***  [0.320]** 
Ln(1+Tariff_ij)  -1.462  -0.352  -1.509  -0.305  -2.151  -0.325  -1.37  -0.155 
   [0.222]***  [0.173]**  [0.220]***  [0.147]**  [0.236]***  [0.163]**  [0.223]***  [0.202] 
Ln(GDP_i)  1.078  0.387  1.011  0.211  1.193  0.324  1.027  0.339 
  [0.014]***  [0.015]***  [0.014]***  [0.014]***  [0.015]***  [0.013]***  [0.018]***  [0.030]*** 
Ln(Population_i)  0.154  0.096  0.133  0.042  0.098  0.074  0.11  0.053 
   [0.014]***  [0.014]***  [0.015]***  [0.013]***  [0.015]***  [0.014]***  [0.020]***  [0.030]* 
Ln(Distance_ij)  -1.131  -0.404  -1.047  -0.255  -0.024  -0.022  -1.064  -0.356 
   [0.018]***  [0.025]***  [0.018]***  [0.020]***  [0.001]***  [0.002]***  [0.018]***  [0.028]*** 
RTA_ij  0.432  1.046  0.555  0.694  0.98  0.735  0.49  0.841 
   [0.037]***  [0.140]***  [0.037]***  [0.072]***  [0.026]***  [0.059]***  [0.038]***  [0.111]*** 
Landlocked_i  -0.163  -0.147  -0.097  -0.077  0.049  -0.165  -0.121  -0.198 
   [0.034]***  [0.031]***  [0.035]***  [0.031]**  [0.036]  [0.028]***  [0.039]***  [0.041]*** 
Border  1.047  -0.11  1.161  0.045  2.311  0.552  1.095  -0.068 
  [0.073]***  [0.216]  [0.068]***  [0.118]  [0.067]***  [0.138]***  [0.068]***  [0.168] 
Common_Language  0.597  0.577  0.443  0.294  0.64  0.64  0.406  0.544 
  [0.036]***  [0.047]***  [0.037]***  [0.041]***  [0.035]***  [0.049]***  [0.038]***  [0.064]*** 
Colonial_Relationship  0.442  -0.807  0.567  -0.797  -0.175  -0.595  0.554  -0.734 
  [0.060]***  [0.229]***  [0.057]***  [0.093]***  [0.047]***  [0.129]***  [0.056]***  [0.331]** 
Common_Colonizer  0.962  0.097  0.921  0.071  1.327  0.126  0.963  0.09 
   [0.057]***  [0.049]**  [0.058]***  [0.043]*  [0.062]***  [0.047]***  [0.060]***  [0.057] 
Entry _Cost_ij     -0.171           -0.283     -0.107 
     [0.052]***           [0.046]***     [0.056]* 
Lag_positive_X_ij (=1[Xij(t-1)>0])           1.434             
            [0.030]***             
Ln(GDPpc_i) x Ln(ICT_i)                    0.225  0.028 
                    [0.027]***  [0.032] 
Ln(GDPpc_i) x Ln(Infrastructure_i)                    -0.13  -0.098 
                    [0.031]***  [0.044]** 
Ln(GDPpc_i) x 
Ln(Border_Transport_Effic_i)                    -0.068  0.145 
                    [0.042]  [0.035]*** 
Ln(GDPpc_i) x Ln(Business_ 
Environment_i)                    -0.028  0.017 
                    [0.022]  [0.031] 
Constant  -3.546  -4.646  -1.048  -4.349  -15.501  0.582  -2.847  -3.263 
   [0.304]***  [0.359]***  [0.323]***  [0.308]***  [0.334]***  [0.458]  [0.367]***  [0.502]*** 
Observations  40400  40400  40400  40400  40400  40400  40400  40400 
All regressions include time and importer fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
a  This regression includes multilateral resistance terms for distance, RTAs, common border, common language, colonial relationship, and common colonizer post-1945 36 
 
Table 4. Estimation with Different Methods 





Selection  OLS Tobit  Et  -Tobit  Poisson   
Ln(Border_Transport_Effic_i)  0.071  0.265  0.046  0.546  0.162  0.104 
  [0.041]*  [0.025]***  [0.041]  [0.059]***  [0.026]***  [0.076] 
Ln(Business_ Environment_i)  0.147  -0.047  0.153  -0.046  0.128  0.198 
  [0.030]***  [0.030]  [0.030]***  [0.056]  [0.024]***  [0.068]*** 
Ln(ICT_i)  0.118  0.066  0.079  0.421  0.081  0.197 
  [0.036]***  [0.028]**  [0.035]**  [0.059]***  [0.026]***  [0.083]** 
Ln(Infrastructure_i)  0.467  0.196  0.485  0.732  0.44  -0.027 
   [0.045]***  [0.040]***  [0.045]***  [0.081]***  [0.035]***  [0.074] 
Ln(1+Tariff_ij)  -1.462  -0.352  -1.485  -1.581  -0.948  -2.248 
   [0.222]***  [0.173]**  [0.222]***  [0.363]***  [0.155]***  [0.472]*** 
Ln(GDP_i)  1.078  0.387  1.079  1.405  0.992  0.518 
  [0.014]***  [0.015]***  [0.014]***  [0.025]***  [0.011]***  [0.026]*** 
Ln(Population_i)  0.154  0.096  0.149  0.233  0.162  0.303 
   [0.014]***  [0.014]***  [0.014]***  [0.025]***  [0.011]***  [0.037]*** 
Ln(Distance_ij)  -1.131  -0.404  -1.128  -1.558  -1.052  -0.602 
   [0.018]***  [0.025]***  [0.018]***  [0.037]***  [0.016]***  [0.025]*** 
RTA_ij  0.432  1.046  0.458  0.147  0.535  0.337 
   [0.037]***  [0.140]***  [0.037]***  [0.081]*  [0.034]***  [0.051]*** 
Landlocked_i  -0.163  -0.147  -0.176  -0.622  -0.201  -0.006 
   [0.034]***  [0.031]***  [0.034]***  [0.063]***  [0.027]***  [0.050] 
Border  1.047  -0.11  1.06  0.83  1.03  0.496 
  [0.073]***  [0.216]  [0.073]***  [0.149]***  [0.063]***  [0.059]*** 
Common_Language  0.597  0.577  0.603  1.528  0.649  0.05 
  [0.036]***  [0.047]***  [0.036]***  [0.074]***  [0.032]***  [0.056] 
Colonial_Relationship  0.442  -0.807  0.445  -0.069  0.419  -0.016 
  [0.060]***  [0.229]***  [0.060]***  [0.168]  [0.071]***  [0.056] 
Common_Colonizer  0.962  0.097  0.957  1.062  0.703  0.154 
   [0.057]***  [0.049]**  [0.057]***  [0.098]***  [0.042]***  [0.129] 
Entry _Cost_ij     -0.171             
      [0.052]***             
Constant  -3.546 -4.646 -6.015 -7.252 -0.754 6.408 
    [0.304]*** [0.359]*** [0.322]*** [0.567]*** [0.244]*** [0.435]*** 
Observations  40400 40400 35762 40400 40400 40400 
R-squared        0.75          
All regressions include time and importer fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.   
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 5.  Robustness Checks 


















Ln(Border_Transp_Effic_i)(resid)  -0.108                
[0.071]                
Ln(Business_ Env_i)(resid)  0.234                
[0.035]***               
Ln(ICT_i)(resid)  0.007                
[0.058]                
Ln(Infrast_i)(resid)  2.588                
   [0.221]***               
Ln(Border_Transp_Effic_i)(t-3)     0.406             
   [0.090]***            
Ln(Business_ Env_i)(t-3)     0.147             
   [0.055]***            
Ln(ICT_i)(t-3)     0.109             
   [0.058]*             
Ln(Infrast_i)(t-3)     0.584             
      [0.093]***            
Ln(Border_Transp_Effic_i)        0.146  0.128  0.206    
      [0.0395]*** [0.043]***  [0.079]***    
Ln(Business_ Env_i)        0.128  0.096  0.029    
      [0.0290]*** [0.033]***  [0.061]    
Ln(ICT_i)        0.256  0.025  0.221    
      [0.0357]*** [0.038]  [0.081]***    
Ln(Infrast_i)        0.145     0.611    
         [0.0443]***    [0.089]***    
Ln(Infrast)           0.829       
Including WDI exp           [0.057]***       
 Ln (Border_Transp_Effic_i)                 -0.25 
+ Ln (Border_Transp_Effic_j)                 [0.147]* 
 Ln (Business_ Env_i)                 0.209 
+  Ln (Business_ Env_j)                 [0.111]* 
Ln (ICT_i)                 -0.519 
+ Ln (ICT_j)                 [0.124]***
Ln (Infrast_i)                 1.867 
+ Ln (Infrast_j)                 [0.182]***
Ln(1+Tariff_ij)  -1.337  -0.556  -0.780  -1.447  -1.517  -2.05 
   [0.223]*** [0.449]  [0.206]***  [0.228]***  [0.449]***  [0.224]***38 
 
Ln(GDP_i)  1.195 0.928  0.726 0.887  1.029    
[0.009]*** [0.028]*** [0.0138]*** [0.016]*** [0.026]***    
Ln(Population_i)  -0.023  0.225  0.0714  0.244  0.215    
   [0.010]**  [0.029]*** [0.0136]*** [0.016]***  [0.027]***    
Landlocked_i  -0.095  -0.205  -0.309  -0.129  -0.295    
[0.036]*** [0.068]*** [0.0338]*** [0.036]***  [0.065]***    
Ln(Distance_ij)  -1.049  -0.981  -0.857  -0.967  -1.097  -1.311 
   [0.018]*** [0.036]*** [0.0176]*** [0.019]***  [0.035]***  [0.019]***
RTAij  0.508  0.538  0.298  0.482 0.328 0.428 
   [0.037]*** [0.076]*** [0.0355]*** [0.038]*** [0.073]*** [0.037]***
Border  1.109  1.319  0.166  1.213  1.128  0.611 
[0.068]*** [0.138]*** [0.0824]**  [0.070]***  [0.150]***  [0.075]***
Common_Language  0.423  0.663  -0.00835  0.557  0.855  0.787 
[0.038]*** [0.077]*** [0.0350]  [0.041]***  [0.072]***  [0.038]***
Colonial_Relationship  0.526  0.34  0.0658  0.378  0.191  0.704 
[0.056]*** [0.116]*** [0.0705]  [0.057]***  [0.119]  [0.061]***
Common_Colonizer   0.958  0.85  0.655 0.948 0.93  1.09 
   [0.059]*** [0.118]*** [0.0524]*** [0.059]*** [0.112]*** [0.055]***
Constant -7.796  -5.593  -5.399 -0.55  -4.789  27.996 
   [0.471]*** [0.675]*** [0.287]*** [0.389]  [0.564]***  [0.260]***
Observations 40400  10004  40400 40400  10100  40400 
     
    
All regressions include time and importer fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
1) The baseline specification is estimated by replacing the time varying variables by their 2004-07 
average, so they do not include time fixed effects. 
2) Specification include time, exporter, and importer fixed effects. 
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   (Outcome) (Outcome)  (Outcome)  (Outcome) (Outcome) (Outcome) 
                    
Ln(Border_Transp_Effic_i)  3.783  0.367  0.174  0.626  0.0387  -0.0204 
   [1.059]***  [0.217]*  [0.0537]***  [0.0568]*** [0.0486]  [0.0490] 
Ln(Business_ Env_i)  -0.122  0.332  0.0226  -0.0108  0.0934  0.240 
   [0.336]  [0.122]***  [0.0514]  [0.0522]  [0.0464]**  [0.0424]*** 
Ln(ICT_i)  1.583  -0.340  0.0436  0.104  -0.0971  -0.214 
   [0.683]**  [0.141]**  [0.0637]  [0.0766]  [0.0504]*  [0.0499]*** 
Ln(Infrast_i)  3.186  1.521  0.205  0.453  0.442  0.530 
   [0.631]***  [0.363]***  [0.0890]**  [0.0907]*** [0.0693]***  [0.0651]*** 
Ln(1+Tariff_ij)  -0.367  -0.324  -0.0213  0.00796  -0.0811  -1.883 
   [0.0888]***  [0.0757]*** [0.00392]***  [0.0135]  [0.352]  [0.266]*** 
Ln(GDP_i)  1.729  0.745  0.859  0.424  1.195  1.207 
[0.356]***  [0.0871]*** [0.0991]***  [0.0239]*** [0.0262]***  [0.0246]*** 
Ln(Population_i)  0.117  0.0625  -0.116  0.236  0.0356  0.148 
   [0.136]  [0.0529]  [0.0219]***  [0.0451]*** [0.0255]  [0.0229]*** 
Landlocked_i  1.974  -0.0190  -0.198  0.0224  -0.344  -0.159 
[0.632]***  [0.142]  [0.0640]***  [0.0618]  [0.0591]***  [0.0571]*** 
Ln(Distance_ij)  -2.209  -0.906  -0.888  -0.733  -1.023  -1.289 
   [0.354]***  [0.0774]*** [0.100]***  [0.0494]*** [0.0344]***  [0.0331]*** 
RTAij  0.754  -0.350  0.557  -0.0372  -0.163  1.241 
   [0.359]**  [0.331]  [0.196]***  [0.125]  [0.0764]**  [0.0750]*** 
Border  -3.503  -0.768  0.735  0.139  1.007  1.033 
[1.293]***  [0.589]  [0.373]**  [0.229]  [0.240]***  [0.107]*** 
Common_Language  1.031  0.966  0.317  0.348  0.125  0.710 
[0.452]**  [0.246]***  [0.0916]***  [0.0822]*** [0.0783]  [0.0654]*** 
Colonial_Relationship  -0.512  0.458  0.372  -0.284  0.890  0.0400 
[0.798]  [0.419]  [0.486]  [0.320]  [0.148]***  [0.217] 
Common_Colonizer   1.234  0.857  0.600  0.640  0.610  1.031 
   [0.516]**  [0.212]***  [0.0962]***  [0.0899]*** [0.112]***  [0.0771]*** 
Constant  -36.10  -13.02  -2.217  -4.060  -6.742  -7.549 
   [9.266]***  [3.958]***  [0.850]***  [0.962]***  [0.515]***  [0.558]*** 
Observations  40400  40400  40400  40400  8832  18768 
All regressions include time and importer fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     
Source: Authors’ estimates.      40 
 
 
Figure 1.  Average Value of Trade Facilitation Indicators by Region 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates.  41 
 
 
Figure 2.  Temporal Evolution of Indicators (Base=1 in 2004) 
    
    
Source: Authors’ estimates.  42 
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Source: Authors’ estimates.  Confidence intervals (CI) at the 95%38 
 
Figure 4. Simulation Results 


































Appendix A. Additional Tables and Graphs 
Table A1. Loading Factors in Exploratory Factor Analysis 
a. Hard infrastructure 
Factors Variance  Difference    Proportion  Cumulative 
Factor1 2.94  0.10  0.47  0.47 
Factor2 2.84  2.17  0.45  0.92 
Factor3 0.67  0.64  0.11  1.03 
Factor4 0.03  .  0.00  1.03 
 
  Factor Loadings   
Variable  Factor 1  Factor 2  Uniqueness 
      Availability of latest ICT technology  0.75  0.57 0.06 
      Level of technology absorption  0.72  0.50 0.17 
      Extent of business internet use  0.73  0.43 0.15 
      Government prioritization of ICT  0.68  0.42 0.34 
      Quality of ports infrastructure  0.47  0.75  0.15 
      Quality of airports infrastructure  0.56  0.72  0.16 
      Quality of roads infrastructure  0.44  0.76  0.15 
      Quality of railroad infrastructure   0.39  0.50  0.36 
 
b. Soft infrastructure or institutional variables 
Factors Variance  Difference    Proportion  Cumulative 
Factor1 4.79  2.20  0.57  0.57 
Factor2 2.59  1.63  0.31  0.88 
Factor3 0.95  0.65  0.10  0.98 
Factor4 0.30  0.28  0.04  1.03 








  Factor Loadings   
Variable  Factor 1  Factor 2  Uniqueness 
      Government transparency   0.83  -0.35 0.08 
      Public trust for government  0.91  -0.22 0.10 
      Irreg. payments in exports and imports  0.77  -0.38 0.08 
      Irreg. payments in public contracts  0.86  -0.30 0.05 
      Measures to combat corruption  0.84  -0.36 0.11 
      Favoritism of gov. to well-connected firms  0.90  -0.23 0.10 
      Number of documents to export  -0.33  0.45  0.35 
      Number of days to export  -0.30  0.89  0.08 
      Number of documents to import  -0.34  0.50  0.31 
















Table A2. Trade Facilitation Variables, 2006 






Border and Transport  
Efficiency 
Iceland 1.00  Singapore  1.00  Denmark  1.00  Estonia  1.00 
Sweden 0.96  Germany  1.00 
New 
Zealand 0.99  Denmark  1.00 
Finland 0.92 
Hong Kong 
SAR 0.98  Singapore  0.99  Sweden 0.98 
Denmark 0.92 France  0.96  Finland  0.98  Singapore  0.98 
Israel 0.91  Netherlands  0.94  Iceland  0.98  Canada  0.97 
Singapore 0.91 Japan  0.94  Norway  0.92  Panama  0.97 




States 0.89  Switzerland  0.92  Sweden  0.90  Norway  0.96 
Switzerland 0.89  Belgium  0.89  Netherlands  0.89 
United 
States 0.95 
Korea, Rep.  0.89  Finland  0.87  Luxembourg  0.87  Netherlands  0.94 
Norway 0.88 
United 
States 0.86  Germany  0.86  Ireland  0.94 
Japan 0.87 
United 
Kingdom 0.83 Australia  0.84 Luxembourg 0.94 
Germany 0.87 Malaysia  0.83 
Hong Kong 
SAR 0.83  Germany  0.94 
United 
Kingdom 0.84 Canada  0.82 
United 
Kingdom 0.82 Austria  0.93 
Canada 0.83  Sweden  0.82  Austria  0.80  Finland  0.93 
Netherlands 0.83  Spain  0.77  Japan  0.74  Belgium  0.93 
Malaysia 0.82  Austria  0.77  Chile  0.72  Switzerland  0.93 
Hong Kong 







Emirates 0.75 Canada  0.72 Japan  0.91 
Australia 0.78  Australia  0.75  Qatar  0.71  France  0.90 
Chile 0.77  Norway  0.73  France  0.70  Israel  0.90 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.77  Luxembourg  0.72  Portugal  0.68  Korea,  Rep.  0.89 
India 0.77  Portugal  0.71  Ireland  0.68  Iceland  0.86 
France  0.75  Israel 0.69  Belgium  0.67  Romania 0.85 
Ireland 0.74 
New 
Zealand 0.68  Israel  0.66 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.84 




Zealand 0.68  Thailand  0.66  Slovenia  0.63  Australia  0.84 47 
 
Belgium 0.67  Tunisia  0.65  Tunisia  0.62  Bahrain  0.83 
Brazil 0.66  South  Africa  0.65 
United 
States 0.61  Lithuania  0.83 
Qatar 0.65  Chile  0.65  Malaysia  0.61  Italy  0.82 
Tunisia 0.65  Namibia  0.63  Estonia  0.60  Latvia  0.82 




Republic 0.62  Greece  0.60  Jordan 0.54  Mauritius 0.82 
Portugal 0.62  Panama  0.60  Bahrain  0.53  Mexico  0.82 
Spain 0.60  Bahrain  0.60  South  Africa  0.52  Poland  0.81 
Italy 0.58  Lithuania 0.58 Botswana 0.51 
Dominican 
Republic 0.80 
Turkey 0.58  Latvia  0.57  El  Salvador  0.50  Spain  0.80 




Republic 0.58  Qatar  0.55  Costa  Rica  0.46  Egypt  0.79 
Jamaica 0.57  Ireland  0.54  Italy  0.45 
Czech 
Republic 0.79 
Hungary 0.57  Kuwait  0.54  Korea,  Rep.  0.45  Hungary  0.79 
El Salvador  0.57  Mauritius  0.54 Greece  0.44 Greece  0.78 
Guatemala 0.57  Jamaica  0.53  Hungary 0.44  Tunisia  0.78 




Republic 0.53 India  0.43 Qatar  0.77 
Slovenia 0.55  Jordan  0.53 
Slovak 
Republic 0.43  Indonesia  0.77 
Lithuania 0.55 El  Salvador  0.53 
Czech 
Republic 0.42  Jamaica  0.76 
Mexico 0.54  Azerbaijan  0.50  Egypt  0.42 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.76 
Philippines 0.53  Pakistan  0.49  Lithuania  0.41  Bulgaria  0.75 
Latvia 0.53  Croatia  0.48  Thailand  0.40  Malaysia  0.75 
China 0.51  Morocco  0.46  Peru  0.39  Georgia  0.75 
Bahrain 0.51 
Slovak 
Republic 0.46 Algeria  0.39 Chile  0.74 
Peru 0.51  China  0.46 Turkey  0.39 Turkey  0.74 
Jordan 0.50  Italy  0.46  Mauritius 0.39 China  0.72 
Azerbaijan 0.49  Egypt  0.46  Poland  0.38  Tanzania  0.72 
Kuwait 0.49 
Dominican 
Republic 0.45 Colombia 0.38 Ghana  0.72 
Uruguay 0.49  Hungary  0.45  Guatemala 0.38  Slovenia  0.72 
Egypt 0.47  Mexico  0.44  Croatia  0.37  Jordan  0.72 
Costa Rica  0.47  Turkey  0.42  Ghana  0.37  Sri Lanka  0.71 
Morocco 0.46  Poland  0.41  Mexico  0.37  Colombia  0.71 
Colombia 0.46 
Russian 
Federation 0.40  Bulgaria  0.37  Thailand  0.70 48 
 
Argentina 0.45 Ghana  0.39  Namibia  0.35  Croatia  0.70 
Kazakhstan 0.45  Guatemala  0.38  Gambia  0.35  Gambia  0.70 
Pakistan 0.44  Botswana  0.38  China  0.34  Vietnam  0.70 
Kenya 0.43  Uruguay  0.38  Jamaica  0.34  Brazil  0.69 
Poland 0.43  Sri  Lanka  0.37  Tanzania  0.34  Nicaragua  0.69 
Venezuela 0.43  Tanzania  0.37  Moldova 0.34  Philippines  0.69 
Croatia 0.42  Argentina  0.36  Panama  0.32  Costa  Rica  0.69 




Federation  0.42  Kenya 0.35  Brazil  0.32  Argentina 0.68 
Indonesia 0.42 Gambia  0.34  Kazakhstan 0.31  Albania  0.66 
Greece 0.42 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.34  Ethiopia 0.31  India  0.65 
Tanzania 0.41  Kazakhstan  0.34 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 0.30  Bangladesh  0.65 
Cambodia 0.40  Georgia  0.33  Malawi  0.30  Algeria  0.65 
Nigeria 0.40  Bulgaria  0.33  Ukraine  0.29  Moldova  0.65 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.40  Colombia  0.33  Pakistan  0.29  Peru  0.64 
Vietnam 0.39  Ukraine  0.32  Nicaragua  0.28  Pakistan  0.63 
Mauritius 0.39 Brazil  0.31  Armenia 0.28  Morocco  0.63 
Sri Lanka  0.38  Cambodia  0.31  Indonesia  0.28  Bolivia  0.62 
Madagascar 0.38  Romania  0.30  Georgia  0.27  Kuwait  0.62 
Mali 0.37  Algeria  0.30 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.25  Armenia  0.62 
Ghana 0.37  Philippines 0.29  Azerbaijan  0.25  Honduras  0.62 
Uganda 0.36  Vietnam  0.28 
Dominican 
Republic 0.24  Uganda  0.61 
Namibia 0.36  Zimbabwe  0.28  Mozambique  0.24  Guyana  0.61 
Armenia 0.35  Ecuador  0.28  Honduras  0.23  El  Salvador  0.60 
Gambia 0.35  Indonesia  0.28 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.23  Madagascar  0.60 
Ecuador 0.34  Venezuela  0.26  Mali  0.23  Benin  0.59 
Botswana 0.33 Nigeria  0.25 
Russian 
Federation 0.22  Mongolia  0.58 
Ukraine 0.31  Zambia  0.25  Madagascar  0.22  Cameroon  0.57 
Honduras 0.30 Costa  Rica  0.25  Mongolia  0.22  Botswana  0.57 
Benin 0.30  Armenia  0.24  Sri  Lanka  0.21  Ukraine  0.57 
Algeria 0.29  Bangladesh  0.23  Vietnam  0.21  South  Africa  0.56 
Nicaragua 0.29  Nicaragua  0.23  Albania  0.21  Kenya  0.55 
Bangladesh 0.28  Peru  0.22  Romania  0.21  Uruguay  0.55 
Georgia 0.27  Ethiopia  0.22  Philippines  0.21  Mozambique  0.54 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 0.26  Guyana  0.22  Bolivia  0.20  Guatemala  0.54 49 
 
Bolivia 0.25  Moldova  0.22  Argentina  0.20  Ecuador  0.53 
Bulgaria 0.24  Mozambique 0.21  Guyana  0.20  Namibia  0.52 
Mongolia 0.23 Madagascar  0.20  Kenya  0.18  Paraguay  0.50 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.23  Uganda  0.20 Nigeria  0.17 Ethiopia  0.49 
Zambia 0.22 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 0.18  Ecuador  0.17  Nigeria  0.49 
Cameroon 0.20  Malawi  0.17  Zimbabwe  0.17 
Russian 
Federation 0.44 
Ethiopia 0.20  Benin  0.17  Paraguay  0.17  Zambia  0.42 
Moldova 0.19  Mongolia  0.16  Benin  0.16  Venezuela  0.40 
Malawi 0.19  Paraguay  0.16  Uganda  0.15  Zimbabwe  0.39 





Republic 0.13  Mali  0.33 
Zimbabwe 0.15  Mali  0.13  Cambodia  0.13  Malawi  0.31 
Mozambique 0.14  Bolivia  0.12  Venezuela  0.12  Azerbaijan  0.28 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 0.14  Cameroon  0.11  Chad  0.09  Chad  0.20 
Albania 0.11 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.10  Zambia  0.07 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 0.07 
Chad 0.06  Chad  0.04  Bangladesh  0.02  Kazakhstan  0.02 
Note: Each variable was standardized to a 0 to 1 range over the period 2003-06 to facilitate comparison. 






Table A3. Additional Robustness Checks 
   Baseline No Tariff  Baseline Importer  Baseline Imp & Exp FE 
   Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection 
Ln(Border_Transp_Effic_i)  0.0192  0.217        -0.0973  0.0294 
   [0.0410]  [0.0235]***        [0.0979]  [0.0781] 
Ln(Business_ Env_i)  0.168  -0.0369        0.00719  -0.128 
   [0.0299]***  [0.0274]        [0.0690]  [0.0741]* 
Ln(ICT_i)  0.0684  0.0621        -0.100  0.229 
   [0.0354]*  [0.0263]**        [0.0579]*  [0.0468]*** 
Ln(Infrast_i)  0.463  0.167        0.207  0.0503 
   [0.0446]***  [0.0378]***        [0.154]  [0.158] 
Ln(GDP_i)  1.077  0.325        0.814  1.323 
   [0.0137]***  [0.0133]***        [0.343]**  [0.291]*** 
Ln(Population_i)  0.135  0.0636        -2.379  1.882 
   [0.0141]***  [0.0132]***        [0.998]**  [1.027]* 
Landlocked_i  -0.162  -0.191        -13.65  -7.885 
   [0.0340]***  [0.0289]***        [4.638]***  [2.461]*** 
Ln(Distance_ij)  -1.119  -0.368  -1.303  -0.490  -1.280  -0.549 
   [0.0177]***  [0.0226]***  [0.0164]***  [0.0250]***  [0.0188]***  [0.0322]*** 
RTAij  0.453  0.866  0.421  0.784  0.420  0.818 
   [0.0371]***  [0.100]***  [0.0329]***  [0.103]***  [0.0358]***  [0.130]*** 
Border  1.063  -0.108  0.570  -0.112  0.634  -0.106 
   [0.0716]***  [0.152]  [0.0696]***  [0.169]  [0.0732]***  [0.201] 
Common_Language  0.567  0.512  0.562  0.549  0.676  0.671 
   [0.0363]***  [0.0419]***  [0.0345]***  [0.0467]***  [0.0384]***  [0.0545]*** 
Colonial_Relationship  0.463  -0.706  0.796  -0.318  0.770  -0.579 
   [0.0587]***  [0.157]***  [0.0573]***  [0.172]*  [0.0603]***  [0.232]** 
Common_Colonizer   0.950  0.0787  0.923  0.0208  1.031  0.343 
   [0.0567]***  [0.0450]*  [0.0542]***  [0.0475]  [0.0550]***  [0.0555]*** 
Ln(Border_Transp_Effic_j)        -0.00457  -0.166       
         [0.0293]  [0.0280]***       
Ln(Business_ Env_j)        0.162  0.606       
         [0.0300]***  [0.0262]***       
Ln(ICT_j)        -0.167  -0.318       
         [0.0292]***  [0.0270]***       
Ln(Infrast_j)        0.486  -0.269       
         [0.0409]***  [0.0366]***       
Ln(1+Tariff_ij)        -3.195  -1.027  -2.081  -0.209 
         [0.213]***  [0.119]***  [0.223]***  [0.181] 
Ln(GDP_j)        0.860  0.462       
         [0.0123]***  [0.0125]***       
Ln(Population_j)        0.182  0.00247       
         [0.0127]***  [0.0128]       
Landlocked_j        -0.338  0.0542       
         [0.0301]***  [0.0282]*       
Entry _Cost_ij     -0.155     -0.105     -0.0102 
      [0.0465]***     [0.0437]**     [0.0552] 51 
 
Constant  -3.506  -3.085  -1.369  -4.126  54.66  -47.89 
   [0.303]***  [0.329]***  [0.313]***  [0.319]***  [21.64]**  [16.03]*** 
Observations  40400  40400  40400  40400  40400  40400 
All regressions include time and importer fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from COMTRADE for trade flows; TRAINS for tariffs; and WDI, 




Table A4. Additional Regressions on New Goods 
 
New Goods: Baseline No 
Tariff  New goods: MRT-correction
a 
New goods: INTERACTIONS 
WITH GDPpc 
   Outcome  Selection  Outcome  Selection  Outcome  Selection 
Ln(Border_Transport_Effic_i)  0.133  0.319  0.196  0.271  0.414  -1.031 
[0.0393]***  [0.0249]***  [0.0396]***  [0.0229]***  [0.293]  [0.203]*** 
Ln(Business_ Environment_i)  0.131  -0.0447  0.255  0.00657  0.0567  -0.432 
[0.0291]***  [0.0288]  [0.0306]***  [0.0269]  [0.140]  [0.160]*** 
Ln(ICT_i)  0.253  -0.0326  -0.139  -0.0235  -0.618  0.179 
[0.0356]***  [0.0273]  [0.0372]***  [0.0252]  [0.173]***  [0.155] 
Ln(Infrastructure_i)  0.134  0.307  0.320  0.268  3.806  0.481 
   [0.0442]***  [0.0376]***  [0.0459]***  [0.0355]***  [0.231]***  [0.257]* 
Ln(1+Tariff_ij)        -1.204  -0.304  -0.714  -0.281 
         [0.215]***  [0.163]*  [0.206]***  [0.164]* 
Ln(GDP_i)  0.731  0.476  0.924  0.390  0.458  0.534 
[0.0137]***  [0.0147]***  [0.0147]***  [0.0133]***  [0.0177]***  [0.0261]*** 
Ln(Population_i)  0.0665  0.0847  0.0374  0.0609  0.355  0.000528 
   [0.0136]***  [0.0134]***  [0.0139]***  [0.0131]***  [0.0177]***  [0.0250] 
Ln(Distance_ij)  -0.858  -0.514  0.000602  -0.0303  -0.858  -0.487 
   [0.0176]***  [0.0238]***  [0.00100]  [0.00328]***  [0.0174]***  [0.0239]*** 
RTA_ij  0.299  1.066  0.941  0.974  0.282  1.204 
   [0.0354]***  [0.106]***  [0.0245]***  [0.0678]***  [0.0353]***  [0.128]*** 
Landlocked_i  -0.303  -0.138  -0.120  -0.151  -0.121  -0.208 
   [0.0338]***  [0.0292]***  [0.0351]***  [0.0272]***  [0.0359]***  [0.0311]*** 
Border  0.172  -0.295  0.982  0.506  0.106  -0.115 
[0.0820]**  [0.149]**  [0.0708]***  [0.128]***  [0.0809]  [0.191] 
Common_Language  -0.00747  0.494  0.0475  0.742  0.0199  0.486 
[0.0350]  [0.0441]***  [0.0290]  [0.0471]***  [0.0347]  [0.0451]*** 
Colonial_Relationship  0.0748  -0.795  0.0312  -0.537  0.141  -0.672 
[0.0702]  [0.203]***  [0.0479]  [0.119]***  [0.0687]**  [0.273]** 
Common_Colonizer  0.656  0.0833  0.893  0.0542  0.687  0.0735 
   [0.0524]***  [0.0471]*  [0.0548]***  [0.0457]  [0.0526]***  [0.0484] 
Entry _Cost_ij     -0.280     -0.390     -0.240 
   [0.0488]***     [0.0459]***     [0.0496]*** 
Ln(GDPpc_i) x Ln(ICT_i)              0.110  -0.0279 
            [0.0239]***  [0.0234] 
Ln(GDPpc_i) x Ln(Infrastructure_i)              -0.468  -0.0289 
            [0.0290]***  [0.0355] 
Ln(GDPpc_i) x Ln(Border_Transport_Effic_i)              -0.0250  0.181 
            [0.0395]  [0.0276]*** 
Ln(GDPpc_i) x Ln(Business_ Environment_i)              0.0277  0.0521 
            [0.0198]  [0.0229]** 
Constant  -5.450  -5.881  -19.84  -0.286  -5.774  -6.303 
   [0.286]***  [0.338]***  [0.327]***  [0.458]  [0.325]***  [0.380]*** 
Observations  40400  40400  40400  40400  40400  40400 
All regressions include time and importer fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
a  This regression includes multilateral resistance terms for distance, RTAs, common border, common language, colonial relationship, and common colonizer 
post-1945.  53 
 





Trade facilitation indicators and trade volumes predicted by exporter-dummies.   
We perform a two-step procedure to compare the explanatory power of our trade 
facilitation variables with respect to other regressors in the model. In the first step, we estimate 
our baseline model replacing our exporter specific variables with exporter dummies. In the 
second step, a variable ‘y’ containing the estimates of exporter-dummy coefficients,is regressed 
on exporter’s trade facilitation indicators as other variables of the model.  ‘y’ can be interpreted 
as the volume of trade predicted by exporter dummies. For each regressor in the second step, we 
estimate its partial and semipartial correlations with  ‘y’, as well as their square terms, reported 
in table B1 below. Estimates are obtained using the pcorr Stata Command. 
Table B1 














Ln(Border_Transport_Effic_i) 0.1001  0.0738  0.01  0.0054  0 
Ln(Business_ Environment_i)  -0.1367  -0.1012  0.0187  0.0102  0 
Ln(ICT_i) 0.2534  0.1921  0.0642  0.0369  0 
Ln(Infrastructure_i) 0.3111  0.24  0.0968 0.0576  0 
Ln(1+Tariff_ij) -0.0149  -0.0109  0.0002  0.0001  0.003 
Ln(Distance_ij) 0.0932  0.0686  0.0087  0.0047  0 
RTA_ij 0.0355  0.0261  0.0013  0.0007  0 
Border 0.0777  0.0571  0.006  0.0033  0 
Common_Language -0.0059  -0.0043  0 0 0.236 
Colonial_Relationship 0.0319  0.0234  0.001  0.0005  0 
Common_Colonizer -0.1339  -0.0991 0.0179  0.0098  0 
 
 
The partial correlation between ‘y’ and a regressor attempt to estimate the correlation that 
would be observed between y and each regressor if the remaining regressors do not vary. The 
semipartial correlation, also called part correlation, between y and a given regressor is an attempt 
to estimate the correlation that would be observed between them after the effects of all remaining 
regressors are removed from the regressor but not from ‘y’. Both squared correlations estimate 55 
 
the proportion of the variance of y that is explained by each predictor. Indeed, the squared partial 
correlation is a measure of total variance of ‘y’ explained by the regressor and not associated to 
other variables, whereas the squared semipartial correlation can be interpreted as the reduction in 
the R-squared when the regressor is removed from the regression.  All the TF indicators are 
significant at the conventional significance level. Overall, the trade facilitation indicators, 
notably physical infrastructure, have a greater contribution to the total variance, compared to 
other variables, such as tariffs, distance, or colonial dummies. The infrastructure variable has the 
highest value Squared SCC, explaining 5.7% of the variance, followed by the ICT indicator that 
adds 3.6 % to the explained variance.  
 
 
 